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Abstract
This paper studies entrepreneurs’ choice of investors, who must provide ﬁnancial capital
and eﬀort for projects with externalities. Venture capitalists (VCs) and individual
investors (angels) compete to ﬁnance the projects. VCs seek to invest into a portfolio of
projects, while angels have more slack in how much they invest into one project. In the
presence of externalities between projects, VCs can potentially increase the total value
of their investment portfolio through better coordination of investment, while some
angels behave indulgently and give more ﬁnancial investment than necessary, earning
zero proﬁts in equilibrium. Surprisingly, externalities do not give VCs as much of an
advantage as one would expect. Quite often VCs lose out to angels even when this
means that some projects will not receive an optimal amount of eﬀort. In the projects
they invest in, VCs always make strictly positive proﬁts despite the competition.
JEL classiﬁcation: G24, G32Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 2
A recent trend in entrepreneurial ﬁnance has been the emergence of networks of related start-
up companies funded by one investor. In spite of the abundance of anecdotal evidence, to our
knowledge no comprehensive theory of how network externalities aﬀect the ﬁnancing decision and
future values of ﬁrms has yet been put forward.
Empirical literature, from Sahlman (1990) to Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) describes the ac-
tivities and compares the characteristics of two main groups of investors into innovative projects
– business angels and venture capitalists (VCs). However, some questions remain unanswered:
for instance, what determines entrepreneurs’ choice of investors, and what role do the externality
eﬀects play in this choice? Is VCs’ reputation as vultures who earn abnormal proﬁts at the expense
of entrepreneurs really justiﬁed? And if it is, why do these proﬁts not fall with competition? When
and why would entrepreneurs go to VCs instead of angels?
We provide some answers to these questions. In this paper we develop a theoretical framework
to study how externalities between portfolio companies aﬀect the investment decisions of diﬀerent
groups of investors. Using this framework, we analyze entrepreneurs’ choice of investor for their
innovative projects.
Due to the self interests of investors and entrepreneurs, externalities between the projects’
outcomes can potentially lead to suboptimal solutions, even if contracts are publicly observable
(see, e.g., Segal (1999)). Suboptimality can be exempliﬁed as underinvestment or no investment at
all into a worthy project.
The situation is only aggravated by the moral hazard problem caused by the noncontractibility
of an investment’s non-monetary element. In order to commit to higher investment, investors need
higher stakes in the companies they invest in, and this results in strictly positive proﬁts for these
investors – a condition that entrepreneurs are not happy to agree to, if they have any alternative.
Angel investors and venture capitalists (VCs) use two diﬀerent mechanisms to alleviate this
problem. Because VCs invest in portfolios of ﬁrms, by internalizing externalities and coordinating
investments in order to maximize the overall value of their investment portfolio, VCs are in a better
position to commit to providing investment that will beneﬁt all their portfolio ﬁrms. Rich angel
investors, meanwhile, use the fact that the ﬁnancial component of an investment is contractible.
They ask for higher stakes in return for giving more money and indulgently allowing entrepreneurs
to divert part of the invested money to the entrepreneurs’ personal needs, thus potentially changing
the projects’ outcome. Since angels are investing their own money at their own discretion, there
is nothing to stop such indulgent behavior, which can relieve the moral hazard problem and does
tend to shift entrepreneurs’ preferences to angel investment.
VCs often lose out to their rivals, the indulgent angels, who come out as surprise winners,
earning zero proﬁt not as a fair return on necessary investment, but by getting a higher stake in
return for overinvestment in projects. When VCs are chosen as project investors, they earn strictly
positive proﬁt despite the competition with other VCs.
Our paper builds upon a growing body of literature studying investors in risky innovative
projects and their contracts with the entrepreneurs. As stated earlier, these studies have identiﬁed
two major groups emerge as the main suppliers of capital to this type of projects – business angelsIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 3
and VCs. Angels are rich individuals who invest their own money. VCs are professionals, who raise
money for VC funds from individuals and institutional investors and act as the general partners of
VC funds managing the capital raised.
From the literature we know that both angels and VCs not only provide ﬁnancial capital, but are
also actively involved in monitoring, advising and formulating business strategy, (see, e.g., Kaplan
and Stromberg (2001), Prowse (1998), Ehrlich et al. (1994), Gorman and Sahlman (1989)). Ehrlich
et al. (1994) ﬁnd that in comparison with business angels, VCs are more involved in the management
of portfolio companies. Probably this is due to the fact that angels’ resources, such as personal
time, are more limited than VCs’. In this paper we assume that VCs can provide both ﬁnancing and
advising for a portfolio of companies, while angels can invest human capital into only one company,
even if they are wealthy enough to provide ﬁnancing for several companies. This assumption is
consistent with the existent literature. For example, Gorman and Sahlman (1989) report that VC
ﬁrms in their sample have an average portfolio of nine entrepreneurial companies. Kanniainen and
Keuschnigg (2000) and Kanniainen and Keuschnigg (2001) model portfolio investment and optimal
portfolio size. In their models, the VC faces a trade-oﬀ between rents from a bigger number of
companies and the correspondingly diminishing quality of advice.
To summarize, for the purposes of this paper we assume two major diﬀerences between angels
and VCs: 1) angels invest their own money, while VCs invest other partners’ money and are more
accountable for their investment and 2) although some extremely rich angels can provide ﬁnancing
for several companies, even they cannot be actively involved with more than one company.
In our model, portfolio investment does not diminish the quality of the advising eﬀort, if this
eﬀort is exerted. The problem arises from the fact that unlike the amount of ﬁnancial investment,
the eﬀort exerted by an investor is not contractible. This leads to the moral hazard problem, which
can be resolved by a speciﬁc contract design. For example, Repullo and Suarez (1998) ﬁnd that in
a double-sided moral hazard problem the optimal contract between VCs and an entrepreneur has
the characteristics of convertible preferred stock. Hellmann, in a series of papers (Hellmann (1994),
Hellmann (1998a) and Hellmann (2002)), studies why and under what circumstances entrepreneurs
would voluntarily relinquish control to VCs. This happens, for example, when VCs have better
expertise in decisions aﬀecting the value of the ﬁrm. Casamatta (2000) shows that when a VC’s
investment (in terms of both cash and eﬀort) is high, it is optimal to give him convertible bonds,
and when it is low, he should receive common stock.
Our model is close to those of Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995) and Cabral (1998). In Cabral
(1998) diﬀerent parties commit together to a potentially rewarding joint venture. However, the
free-rider problem hinders innovation – if the project is successful, the discovery (technological
innovation) becomes a public good, and so the parties have an incentive to deviate from jointly-
optimal behavior (to underinvest) at the outset, in order to free-ride. Bhattacharya and Chiesa
(1995) have a similar model with implications closer to those of this paper, although they do not
consider a moral hazard problem – in their model all investment is contractible. They study the
interaction between ﬁnancial decisions and the disclosure of interim research results to competing
ﬁrms. Technological knowledge revealed to a ﬁrm’s ﬁnancier(s) need not also ﬂow to its R&D andIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 4
product market competitors. The authors show that the choice of ﬁnancing source can serve as a
precommitment device for pursuing ex-ante eﬃcient strategies in knowledge-intensive environments.
Hellmann (1998b) and Ueda (2000) have models where the entrepreneur’s choice of investors
takes into account the possibility that investors can steal the entrepreneur’s idea. Unlike Ueda’s
paper, where stealing by a VC is seen necessarily as a bad thing, in our model information spillover
is two-directional and can bring more value to the entrepreneur, because he could be the one who
beneﬁts from using others’ ideas.
Our model studies entrepreneurs’ choice of investors in the presence of externalities between
their projects and unobservable eﬀort by investors. It features two entrepreneurs, each with a risky
two-stage project that requires investment from outside investors. The ﬁrst stage develops a new
technology and requires a small, but contractible ﬁnancial investment, plus an expert human capital
investment, which is not contractible. Only angels and VCs possess the necessary ﬁnancial and
human capital. In return for their investment, investors receive a share in a project. The second
stage commercializes this technology.
The externalities in the model are due to the fact that the results of the R&D stage of one
project aﬀect the success/failure of the second stage of both projects.
Our objective is to study what kind of investors will be chosen by entrepreneurs for their projects.
As in real life, the angel investors form a heterogeneous group. They have varying levels of wealth
and some of them are rich enough to provide ﬁnancing to both projects. However, even they cannot
put the non-ﬁnancial eﬀort into both projects. Since angel investors invest their own money, they
can be more lenient (indulgent) than VCs over what entrepreneurs do with their money. VCs invest
other people’s money, and accordingly seek to limit their investment to what is necessary and no
more. On the other hand, each VC has enough human capital resources to support two projects at
the same. Both angels and VCs want to maximize their proﬁts and compete with each other.
In our paper we show that coordinated investment by VCs guarantees proﬁtable investment in
some projects for which angel investment would be suboptimal in terms of exerted eﬀort. In this
case the VCs’ proﬁts are strictly positive, although they do not depend on the value of the projects’
payoﬀ.
Surprisingly, the eﬀect of information spillover between two projects does not give VCs as much
of an advantage as one would expect. VCs do not usually provide better terms for entrepreneurs
than the angel investors do, and underinvestment remains in a disappointingly large area. What is
even more surprising is that in the regions where indulgent angels achieve the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e ,
a VC can never match them.
Our results imply that in innovation driven industries, we should observe angel investment into
relatively safe projects on generous ﬁnancial investment terms, whereas VC investors play a more
dominant role in ﬁnancing more risky projects.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section I describes the model. Section II derives
the results, which are discussed in Section III. Finally, Section IV concludes.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 5
I. Model
The model has three dates t =0 , 1 and 2. Two entrepreneurs, E1 and E2, are endowed with their
own innovative projects. E1 has project 1 and E2 has project 2. Each project comprises two stages.
The ﬁrst stage, which we call the R&D stage, investigates the feasibility of a potentially promising
technology for a given project. Each project can test only one technology at this stage. Technology
is very broadly deﬁned here. It includes, but is not limited to, new business models, distribution
channels, markets, products and services. Amazon’s ”one-click” shopping, Dell’s direct sales and
FedEx’ hub system are just few examples of such new technologies.
The R&D stage requires investment into a project of ﬁnancial capital, K,a n de x p e r te ﬀort
(human capital), e, in addition to the entrepreneur’s own eﬀort, which is here normalized to zero.1
Unlike K, which is observable and veriﬁable, e can be interpreted as the advising and monitoring
process of investors, which is observable, but not veriﬁable, and therefore cannot be contracted
upon. Since the object of our attention is the eﬀort provided by investors, to simplify our analysis
we assume that K is very small, but still positive.
For a project that receives both K and e, the R&D stage has a probability of success, β.I f
the eﬀort is zero, e =0 , then the R&D stage is unsuccessful. We interpret the result of the ﬁrst
stage as a costly answer to the question: ”Will this technology work?” Investing K and e gives an
entrepreneur and investor the right to put the question and obtain the answer, while investing only
K simply entitles them to observe the other project’s research result. If the project does not even
receive K, then it goes out of business and cannot proceed to the next stage.
The success and failure of the R&D stage of individual projects are independent of the other
project’s outcome. However, as in Bhattacharya and Chiesa (1995), the ﬁnal payoﬀ of each project
is aﬀected by the other project. If at least one project is successful at the R&D stage, this technology
can then be freely adopted by both projects provided that they have funding for the second stage.
In other words, only failure of the R&D stage for both projects renders it impossible to go to the
second stage, which we call the market stage.
At the market stage, the technology is actually implemented and production takes place.
Projects 1 and 2 have payoﬀs V and RV , net of the second stage capital investment. R char-
acterizes the degree of asymmetry between the projects . For clarity, we assume that R ≥ 1.
Investors and contracts
Entrepreneurs need both ﬁnancial and human external capital. As discussed in the introduction,
only two categories of investors can provide bothm o n e ya n de x p e r t i s e .I nc o m p a r i s o nw i t hV C s ,
the angels’ human capital resources are more limited, therefore we assume that one angel investor
can invest e into only one project, while a VC investor has enough resources to invest K and e
into both projects. This is consistent with empirical evidence, e.g., Prowse (1998) and Ehrlich et
al. (1994). Since K is small, in general we assume that rich angel investors can provide ﬁnancing
for both projects. Since angel investors invest their own money, we also allow them to invest moreIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 6
than K, if they deem it necessary. We denote ﬁnancial investment in project i as Ii.
Entrepreneurs choose their investors from a pool of angel investors and VCs. We assume that
there are more than two angel investors and more than two VCs. All investors in the pool have
ﬁnancial wealth of no less than K. Expressed formally, investors oﬀer ﬁnancial investment Ii in
project i in return for αi share of the future cash ﬂow.2 An investor can also make a conditional
oﬀer to both entrepreneurs proposing I1 in return for α1 to E1 and I2 in return for α2 to E2
conditional on this oﬀer’s acceptance by both entrepreneurs.
As mentioned, we also allow wealthy individual investors to oﬀer Ii that is greater than K.I f
Ii >K ,t h e n(Ii − K) is appropriated by Ei for his personal use. Each entrepreneur’s objective is
to maximize his ﬁnal cash ﬂow, that is the sum of his share in the project plus the diverted cash
ﬂow (Ii − K).
Entrepreneurs observe investors’ oﬀers and choose one investor for one project. In other words,
Ei observes all αi’s oﬀered and chooses the investor oﬀering the most attractive one. A joint oﬀer
is considered accepted only if both entrepreneurs accept their respective parts of the oﬀer. We
assume that entrepreneurs cannot make transfer payments to each other. No investment is made
until all the parties are satisﬁed with the share allocations and capital oﬀered.
Only ﬁnancial investment Ii is veriﬁable, but although the eﬀo r tl e v e l sa r en o tv e r i ﬁable, entre-
preneurs correctly anticipate them in equilibrium. To simplify our analysis we also assume that the
eﬀort levels are observed by entrepreneurs and investors and that investor 2 observes the degree of
eﬀort made by investor 1 before exerting his own eﬀort.3
Since investors act competitively, the competition drives their proﬁts down, although not neces-
sarily to zero. Investors have zero reservation utility, so they prefer to participate in projects even
if they have zero expected return.
We assume that everybody is risk-neutral.
As several authors have pointed out, e.g., Hellmann (1994), the VC-entrepreneur relationship
should be analyzed as a two-sided incentive problem. Our model is simpler than the double-sided
moral hazard problem in Repullo and Suarez (1998), because K is very small and this means that,
when entrepreneurs act as agents, they will never divert the total capital investment Ii to their own
beneﬁt. We focus on a single-aspect moral hazard problem, in which entrepreneurs act as principals
and investors act as agents.
Information structure
There is no information asymmetry at t =0 . The project characteristics, such as β, R, V and
required investments K and e are common knowledge. α1, I1, α2 and I2 are publicly observable.
Investor 2 observes investor 1’s eﬀort before exerting his own eﬀort, although the eﬀort is not
veriﬁable. At t =1the R&D results become known and if at least one project is successful, all
projects still in business (meaning those that received ﬁnancing I ≥ K at t =0 ) can freely use its
result, provided that they have ﬁnancing for the second stage.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 7
The timeline
The timeline can be summarized as follows.
At t =0 , the entrepreneurs announce their projects. Investors decide whether or not to par-
ticipate in projects and oﬀer ﬁnancial investment Ii in return for share αi in project i. E1 and
E2 choose their investors. If these investors are diﬀerent, we call them investor 1 and investor 2.
Once the choice of investors becomes ﬁnal, i.e., when both E1 and E2 are satisﬁed with α1 and
α2, investment of ﬁnancial and human capital takes place. Investor 1 makes his investment ﬁrst,
investor 2 observes his exerted eﬀort and makes his own investment.
Projects that receive ﬁnancial investment of less than K do not get oﬀ the ground.
At t =1the success or failure of the R&D stage is observed by all parties that are still in
business. The failed projects can potentially use the technology of the successful project, if there
is one.
At t =2 , the net payoﬀs are realized.
Externality
The R&D externality is created by the transferability of R&D results of one project to the other
project. It is characterized by the probability of success of an individual project, which depends
on the level of eﬀort put into the project. If no eﬀort is put in any project, then the payoﬀ to
each project is zero. Investing e only in project 2 creates the externality for project 1, because its
payoﬀ becomes βV, which is the measure of externality in this case and it reaches its maximum at
β =1 . The payoﬀ to project 2 is βRV.I fe is put in both projects, the expected payoﬀ to project
2 becomes β (2 − β)RV . The diﬀerence between the two payoﬀs, β (1 − β)RV , is the externality
that project 1 investment creates for project 2. This externality reaches its maximum at β = 1
2.
II. Results
F i r s tw ec o n s i d e rt h eﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m e ,d e ﬁned as the result which maximizes the joint surplus
(NPV) of both projects. Since R>1 and K is very small,4 it is never optimal to have only one
project running at the second stage; therefore, there are three possible candidates for the ﬁrst best
outcome:
1. None of the projects receives ﬁnancing. The NPV is zero.
2. One project receives both K and e, while the other project has only K. In the case of success,
both projects continue at the second stage. The expected NPV is β (1 + R)V −(K + e)−K.
3. Both projects receive both K and e. In the case of success, both projects continue at the
second stage. The expected NPV is β(2 − β)(1+R)V − 2(K + e).Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 8
We can easily see that investing e into both projects is the ﬁrst best outcome whenever
½
β(2 − β)(1+R)V − 2(K + e) > 0,
β(2 − β)(1+R)V − 2(K + e) >β(1 + R)V − (K + e) − K.
Since K is small, K<
β2
2 (1 + R)V ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
e<β(1 − β)(1+R)V. (1)
Similarly, we see that investing e into only one project is optimal for
½
e>β (1 − β)(1+R)V,
e ≤ β (1 + R)V − 2K.





e>β(1 + R)V − 2K.
Again, for small K, K<
β2
2 (1 + R)V ,t h i si se q u i v a l e n tt o
e>β(1 + R)V − 2K. (2)
All other things being equal, the zone of investment into both projects grows with R.I ti sa l s o
more advantageous for β to be close to 1
2.I fβ gets any bigger, then it becomes more advantageous
to invest only into one project, because of the externality eﬀect.
Interestingly, due to the externality eﬀect, investment into project 1 can be optimal, even if the
expected net payoﬀ to this project is negative, i.e., if β (2 − β)V< K +e and β (1 − β)(1+R)V>
e.
Two sources of ineﬃciency might preclude from achieving the ﬁrst best result: 1) the selﬁsh
interests of participants, both entrepreneurs and investors, and 2) the coordination problem for
the investors. In the remaining part of this section we describe these ineﬃciencies and show how
investors can restore the ﬁrst best result.
A. Angel investment
We will ﬁrst examine the possible outcomes with angel investment, if VC investment is not available
and angel investors are only competing with each other. This competition drives their proﬁts down
to the level determined by the incentive compatibility (IC) and participation constraints (PC) of
investors and entrepreneurs.
In order to understand what kind of contracts between entrepreneurs and angel investors can
be observed in equilibrium, we start our analysis from the eﬀort choice by two angel investors, whoIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 9
become involved in projects 1 and 2. The angel investing in project i selects his level of eﬀort (zero
or e) so as to maximize his expected proﬁt given his share αi in project i and the share αj in project
j attributable to investor j.
T h eo u t c o m es h o u l db et h eN a s he q u i l i b r i u mo ft h eg a m ed e s c r i b e dt h et r e ei nF i g u r e1a n db y
the following matrix
eﬀort 0 e
0 (0;0) (α1βV;α2βRV − e)
e (α1βV − e;α2βRV) (α1β (2 − β)V − e;α2β (2 − β)RV − e)
where the elements of the matrix are the investors’ expected payoﬀs net of the eﬀort exerted. Rows
correspond to the level of eﬀort exerted by investor 1 and columns correspond to the level of eﬀort
exerted by investor 2.
Possible equilibria are described in Appendix A. There are three subgame perfect equilibria:
(e;e), (0;e) and (0;0).
The minimum values of αe
A,1 and αe










Despite the competition, the net proﬁts of the investors involved in each can remain strictly positive
even at the minimum values αe
A,1 and αe





e − Ii, (4)
where Ii is the ﬁnancial investment into project i provided by the angel investor. For example, if
I1 = I2 = K, then both investors make positive proﬁts.










β (2 − β)V +( I1 − K)=β (2 − β)V −
2−β







β (2 − β)RV +( I2 − K)=β (2 − β)RV −
2−β
1−βe +( I2 − K).
The minimum values of αne
A,1 and αne










where the superscript ”ne”r e f e r st o” n oe ﬀort” by investor 1. Investor 2 still exerts e. The necessaryIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 10
condition for this equilibrium to exist is
K + e ≤ βRV. (6)
If investors receive αne
A,1 and αne
A,2, their proﬁts are zero. The entrepreneurs’ proﬁts are equal to the
NPVs of their projects:
Πne
E1,A = βV − K, Πe
E2,A = βRV − K − e.
In Appendix A we show that for ﬁxed α1 and α2 these two equilibria do not coexist, and from
observing α1 and α2 we can accurately infer the eﬀort level exerted by investor 1.
If (0;0) is the equilibrium both projects have zero gross payoﬀ; hence, none of the investors is
interested in investing in them. We can infer that if
e>β R V , (7)
then no investment is possible, although for e<β(1 − β)(1+R)V the ﬁrst best outcome might
be to invest money and eﬀort into both projects!
Possible outcomes when angel investment is ﬁnancially constrained
Investors eﬀorts are not observable. However, as we have mentioned, in equilibrium entrepreneurs
correctly anticipate them by observing α1 and α2.I fβ (1 − β)V< e < β R V ,t h e n(e;e) equilibrium






is the equilibrium allocation of shares received
by investors. On the other hand, for e<β(1 − β)V , both equilibria are possible depending on the
choice of αA,i by entrepreneurs.
1. For small e, e ≤ β (1 − β),V ,a n g e li n v e s t o r so ﬀer E1 and E2 ﬁnancing K in return for
investors’ shares αA,1 and αA,2, respectively, such that αA,1 ≥ αe
A,1 and αA,2 ≥ αe
A,2.I ft h e i r
oﬀers are accepted, both investors provide money and eﬀort e.
2. If e satisﬁes the inequality e ≤ βRV, E1 can be oﬀered ﬁnancing in return for investor’s share
α0
A,1, in project 1, αne
A,1 ≤ α0
A,1 <α e
A,1,a n dE2 can be oﬀered ﬁnancing in return for α0
A,2
share in project 2, αne
A,2 ≤ α0
A,2 <α e
A,2. Only the project 2 investor provides money and eﬀort
e, while the project 1 investor provides money and zero eﬀort.
3. For e>β R V no angel ﬁnancing is possible.
We will now turn to the contracts that can be oﬀered in the equilibrium. Suppose that angel
investors are ﬁnancially constrained and cannot invest more than K – an assumption that we
will relax later. Since they cannot invest more than K, they compete with each other by asking
entrepreneurs for a smaller αi s h a r et h a tw o u l ds t i l le l i c i ti n v e s t o r s ’c h o i c eo fe ﬀort most preferredIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 11
by entrepreneurs. Since in both equilibria investor 2 provides e, the situation is not symmetrical.
It is the preference by E1 that plays the crucial role in determining the outcome.
For example, if both entrepreneurs prefer an outcome in which investors both provide e,t h e n
the smallest αi share asked for by investor i will be αe
A,i. In this case an investor cannot win a
contract by asking for a slightly smaller share, αA,1 = αe
A,i−ε, because he cannot commit to provide
e at the later stage. However, if (e;e) is not an outcome preferred by E1, then investor 1 cannot
enforce it by asking for αe
A,1. Any investor who concedes ε of this share, thus signalling that he
will not exert e, will leave investors asking for αe
A,1 without a chance of winning the contract. As





is not sustainable in this case
and αA,1 will go down to αne
A,i, generating zero proﬁt for investor 1.
When e ≤ β (1 − β)V angel investors are prepared to provide eﬀort for both projects, which
would lead to the ﬁrst best outcome. In this case, the proﬁts of participating investors are strictly
positive. However, due to the incentive compatibility constraints of entrepreneurs, the condition
e ≤ β (1 − β)V is not suﬃcient to achieve the ﬁrst best outcome. We have to check whether the
IC constraints for entrepreneurs are satisﬁed when e ≤ β (1 − β)V and investors are receiving αe
A,1
and αe
A,2. Suppose that alternatively E1 could choose an investor who would provide investment
K and zero eﬀort in return for αne
A,1. He would still prefer to choose an investor oﬀering investment
for αe















β (1 − β)V
¶









β (1 − β)
2 V + K (1 − β)
2 − β
. (8)
As we have mentioned, because investor 2 always provides eﬀort, the preferences of E2 do not really






e ≤ β (1 − β)
2 RV + K (1 − β),
which holds, if inequality (8) holds.
It is easy to see that if inequality (8) does not hold, E1 will prefer an investor who asks for αne
A,1
in return for his investment. We have already seen why such investors exist despite the fact that
the proﬁt will be zero, while with αe
A,1 the investor’s proﬁt would be strictly positive.
We summarize the results in the following proposition:
Proposition 1. If no angel investor can invest more than K, then angel investment leads to the
following outcomes:Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 12





β(1−β)RV respectively. Both investors provide
money K and eﬀort e. Each investor makes strictly positive proﬁt 1
1−βe−K. E1 has positive
return β (2 − β)V −
2−β
1−βe − K and E2 has positive return β (2 − β)RV −
2−β
1−βe − K.
2. For e satisfying the double inequality
β (1 − β)
2 V + K (1 − β)
2 − β
<e≤ βRV − K (9)
investors 1 and 2 receive, respectively, shares αne
A,2 and αne
A,2 from (5) in return for ﬁnancial
investment K. Investor 2 exerts e, while investor 1 does not exert any eﬀort.
3. For e + K>β R V no angel ﬁnancing is possible.
As we see from Proposition 1, quite often angel investment leads to a suboptimal outcome. For
example, if e<β(1 − β)(1+R)V ,t h e ne x e r t i n ge for both projects is the ﬁr s tb e s ta c t i o n ,w h i l e
the angel investment achieves this result only under a much more restrictive condition of inequality
(8). Similarly, no projects should receive funding only if e+2K>β(1 + R)V , while angel investors
refuse ﬁnancing whenever e + K>β R V.
The ineﬃciency of angel investment stems mainly from the angels’ self interest, because they
make their investment decisions without regard for the impact on the other project’s outcome.
However, it is also partly attributable to entrepreneurs’ selﬁsh interests – even when angels are
ready to provide investment and eﬀort to achieve the ﬁrst best outcome, entrepreneurs might choose
a solution that is in fact suboptimal in terms of the total value created.
Also, although investors act competitively and do not intentionally coordinate their investments,
they do still take the existence of other projects into account.
If we ignored the externality eﬀect of other existing projects, assumed the expected value of
project 1 to be βV and tried to analyze the returns to angel investors on an isolated basis, then
for e satisfying inequality (8) we would encounter the following ”paradox”: angel investors receive
a smaller than ”fair” share in the projects but nevertheless obtain strictly positive returns in the
competitive world.
Of course, in reality there is no paradox once the externality eﬀect is properly factored in.
So far in our analysis we have not allowed investors to invest money in more than one project,
or to invest more than strictly necessary for the project’s success. Therefore, even despite keeping
this seemingly ”smaller than fair” share αA,i, investors cannot be called indulgent – they do not
give entrepreneurs more than the necessary investment K.
In the coming part of our paper, we will relax these two constraints by allowing angel investors
to make ﬁnancial, but not the human capital, investment, into two projects and by allowing them
to invest more than K into one project. Of course, all players still remain rational and are not
prepared to accept negative proﬁts.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 13
Possible outcomes with ﬁnancially unconstrained angel investment
If angel investors do not have monetary constraints, then two separate factors can now aﬀect the
outcome: 1) the same angel investor can ﬁnance both projects, while exerting e for only one of
them and 2) the amount of money invested into one project can exceed K.W eh a v et oe m p h a s i z e
that the same angel investor cannot exert eﬀort e for both projects, because his human capital
resources are limited.
Let us consider ﬁrst that our angel investors are rich and the same investor can invest K into
both projects. Investing into two projects makes sense either if it leads to a diﬀerent outcome or if
it gives the investor a higher proﬁt without lowering that of the entrepreneurs.
If inequality (8) holds, then a rich angel investor cannot provide a viable alternative, for an
obvious reason – he cannot exert e for both projects. If (0;e) is an outcome in Proposition 1, then
the rich investor cannot change the outcome, as he cannot increase his proﬁt( m a k i n gi tp o s i t i v e )
without asking for a higher share in at least one project and the entrepreneur who own the project
concerned will not agree to that.
The only situation in which the two-project investment by the same angel investor might make
ad i ﬀerence is where e + K>β R Vand (0;0) is the outcome in Proposition 1. This gives the
following result
Proposition 2 (Projects’ resuscitation by rich angels). If the system of inequalities
½
K + e>β R V ,
2K + e ≤ β (1 + R)V,
(10)
holds, then one rich angel investor ﬁnances both projects in return for shares αRA,1 and αRA,2 in
projects 1 and 2 respectively, such that
(αRA,1 + αRA,2R)βV =2 K + e. (11)
Proof. The angel investor will demand α1 and α2 such that
(α1 + α2R)βV ≥ 2K + e
with competition driving it down to equality. Such an allocation with αRA,i < 1 always exists. For
example, αRA,1 = αRA,2 = 2K+e
βV(1+R) < 1
The exact values of αRA,1and αRA,2 are the result of bargaining between entrepreneurs and the
investor and are outside the scope of this paper.
The second and, we believe, more interesting situation is the one in which individual investment
can exceed K. This would appear to be an unusual situation, because everybody knows that the
required ﬁnancial investment is K. So for institutional investors, like VCs, investing more than
necessary is highly unlikely. Since angel investors do not have such restrictions, they can investIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 14
more than K if they deem it necessary. Obviously, this can happen only if investors make non-
negative proﬁt as a result. Since in the (0,e) equilibrium investors have zero proﬁt s ,t h e yw i l lh a v e
an incentive to give entrepreneurs more than K only if this leads to an (e,e) equilibrium outcome.
In Proposition 1, for any e satisfying the double inequality
β (1 − β)
2 V + K (1 − β)
2 − β
<e≤ β (1 − β)V
both investors were prepared to exert e, but the IC constraints for entrepreneurs, especially for E1,
precluded this outcome. By oﬀering entrepreneurs a choice between αne
A,i in return for investment
K and αe
A,iin return for investment Ii, with Ii >K , investors can shift entrepreneurs’ preferences



























1−β e − K − (1 − β)βV,
I2 ≥ 1
1−βe − K − (1 − β)βRV;
(12)





Combined with (12) this gives us an inequality
e ≤ β (1 − β)V + K, (13)
which always holds whenever angels’ IC constraints for the (e;e) outcome hold. Of course, in
equilibrium, competition between angel investors will increase Ii until Ii = e
1−β unless all investors’
disposable ﬁnancial resources investment are strictly smaller than e
1−β, in which case the outcome
depends on whether or not there are at least two investors who can invest I1 and I2 that satisfy
( 1 2 ) .W et h u sc o m et ot h ef o l l o w i n gp r o p o s i t i o n .
Proposition 3 (Indulgent angel investors). For 1+R>1, if inequality 13 holds and there
are at least two investors capable of and willing to provide ﬁnancial investment which satisﬁes the
system of inequalities (12), then in return for shares αe
A,1 and αe
A,2 satisfying condition (3), both
projects will receive human capital investment e and ﬁnancial investment I1 and I2,e a c hi ne x c e s s
of K, such that
1. I1 = I2 =
(2−β)
1−β e − K − (1 − β)βV, if there are only two such investors. Both investors earnIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 15
positive proﬁts
(1 − β)βV − e + K;
2. I1 = I2 = Ithird, if all but two investors can invest only strictly less than e
1−β. Ithird is the




3. I1 = I2 = e
1−β if at least three investors can invest e
1−β. Investors’ proﬁts are equal to zero.
We call these angel investors ”indulgent”, because they know that the entrepreneurs will ap-
propriate for personal use part (Ii − K) of their ﬁnancial investment, and nevertheless allow it to
happen.
The good news is that e is now put into both projects. The bad news for investors is that if
there are enough rich investors, they lose all their proﬁts, even in the area satisfying inequality (8)
where angel investors would have positive proﬁt, if they were not rich and indulgent. Of course, this
is good news for entrepreneurs, who make higher proﬁt. Since the combined net value of investors
and entrepreneurs coincides with the ﬁrst best outcome, we may call this result the ”quasi” ﬁrst
best outcome.
B. VC investment
Let us mow suppose that VC investment is possible as well. If VC investors enter the market, then
the only time they create higher value for the projects than angel investors would be in a situation
where putting e into both projects is the ﬁrst best outcome, while angel investors would put e only
into one project. On the other hand, we assume that as institutional investors, VCs cannot make a
ﬁnancial investment in excess of the strictly required level, i.e., they cannot invest more than K in
each project. Without this assumption, VCs could always at least match the angels’ investments.
We also assume that if VCs and angels create identical value for entrepreneurs, the entrepreneurs
will prefer angel investors, due to the less formal nature of angel investment and the higher search
costs involved in obtaining VC investment.
If K is small, then angel ﬁnancing is always possible outside the ”no investment” area determined
by (2).6 In order to win a contract, VCs must oﬀer better deals to both entrepreneurs. The VC who
wins the contract, must credibly commit to put e into both projects and continue both projects at
t =1 , while both entrepreneurs obtain higher value for their stakes thanks to the VC’s investment.
The next proposition establishes, when these conditions holdIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 16






e ≤ βRV − K,
e ≤ (1 − β)
2 β (1 + R)V +2 K (1 − β)
(14)
holds, then VC investment provides a more attractive alternative to angel investment. The VC
investor provides ﬁnancial capital K and human capital e for each project in return for shares α∗
VC , 1
andα∗
VC , 2, such that
α∗
VC , 1 + α∗
VC , 2R =
e


















Proof. The proof is in Appendix B. The proof follows from the IC constraints for the VC and
for the entrepreneurs.
The VC receives a strictly positive proﬁt, because only then is his commitment to exert e for
both projects credible. By assumption, VCs cannot ”waste” money by overinvesting, therefore the
proﬁt remains strictly positive. If we relaxed this assumption, then the situation would resemble
that described in Proposition 3 and instead of K, the VC investor would provide I1 and I2 such
that I1 + I2 =
β
1−βe, Ii ≥ K.
The ability of VC investors to provide the ﬁr s tb e s tr e s u l ti sn o ts u ﬃcient, because it can
be obstructed by entrepreneurs’ lack of interest in such a result. To summarize our results, we
can write that the ﬁrst best outcome which maximizes the combined value of the two projects is
attainable in the following regions:
1. If either system of inequalities (14) or (??) holds, then entrepreneurs will choose a VC who
exerts e for both projects.
2. If inequality (13) holds, then indulgent angel investors are the entrepreneurs’ best choice.
Both projects receive e.
3. If inequality (10) holds, then the same rich angel investor provides ﬁnancing for both projects
and exerts e for one of them.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 17
4. For β (1 − β)(1+R)V ≤ e ≤ βRV −K two angel investors ﬁnance both projects, with only
one project getting e.






e ≤ βRV − K,
e>(1 − β)
2 β (1 + R)V +2 K (1 − β)
holds, then the ﬁrst best outcome is never achieved by investors.
Proof. The proof follows from Proposition 4.
Corollary 5 shows that the despite strictly positive expected proﬁt of a participating VC investor,
when competing for contracts the VCs cannot lure entrepreneurs by conceding part of it (without
investing more than K) due to the moral hazard problem. On the other hand, E1 is adherent to
the suboptimal outcome, because of his higher proﬁts from it. If transfer payment from E2 to E1
were possible, it would make interests of E1 and E2 congruent, but it would not eliminate the VC’s
moral hazard problem.
The fact that in order to guarantee an input of e into both projects, VCs must earn strictly
positive proﬁt, means that when compared with indulgent investment from Proposition 3, VC
investment will always be less attractive. In this case VCs cannot oﬀer entrepreneurs terms that
are comparable to the angels’ contracts. We express this formally in the following proposition.
Proposition 6. If e ≤ β (1 − β)V ,t h e nV C s ’o ﬀers are always strictly dominated by indulgent
investors’ oﬀers.
Proof. The proof is in Appendix B.
III. Discussion and Empirical Implications
Figures 1-5 provide an illustration of our results. Numbers 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the areas of
”poor”, ”rich” and ”indulgent” angel investment, respectively, 4 corresponds to the region of VC
investment, and in area 5 ”no investment” is the ﬁrst best outcome. Tildes denote underinvestment
in the corresponding area. For computational simplicity we assume that K =0 .
Place Figure 1 here
Figure 1 shows how areas of angel and VC investment depend on e/V and β if there is no
asymmetry between projects, i.e., R =1 . We see that the region of VC investment (area 4) is quite
small in comparison with angels’ investment. VCs invest in relatively risky but proﬁtable projects.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 18
Place Figure 2 here
As the asymmetry between projects grows (on Figure 2 R =2 ), the area of the ”two-projects
eﬀort” ﬁrst best outcome also increases, and VCs start investing in a bigger number of projects,
now including projects which are less risky and less proﬁtable conditional on success, i.e., project
1h a sal o w e rp r o ﬁtability index, V
e of the realized payoﬀ. The growth of VC investment area 4
is outpaced by the overall growth of the area where ”two-projects eﬀort” is optimal, thus creating
ineﬃciency due to the angel underinvestment (areas 10 and 20).
The way the area of VC investment grows as the asymmetry between the projects increases is
illustrated more clearly in Figures 3 and 4. For projects with a high V
e ratio (on Figure 3 V
e =4 .1)
VC investment into less risky projects is the contributor to this growth, while for projects with a
more moderate V
e ratio (in Figure 4 V
e =2 ) VC investment expands both into higher and lower
risk projects as the asymmetry grows.
Place Figure 3 here
Place Figure 4 here
In Subsection II. A we were considering equilibrium outcomes in an economy where angel
investors are cash constrained. Figure 5 illustrates what happens in an economy which does not
have rich individual investors. We see that VC investment takes over entire areas of the former
portfolio investments of rich angels, creating additional eﬃciency in area 4∗ and encroaching on the
former area of indulgent angel investment, but not completely – low risk projects are taken over by
separate angel investors whose investment is suboptimal (area 100). In area 4∗ the VC investor still
makes a positive proﬁt, while in the remaining areas, formerly the reserve rich angel investment,
his expected proﬁt is zero.
Place Figure 5 here
Therefore, from Figure 5 we can infer that in comparison with rich economies, in poor economies
one should observe more VC investment than angel investment, with angels holding the ground
in investment into relatively safe and moderately proﬁtable projects and VCs overtaking them in
less proﬁtable projects and highly proﬁtable, but risky projects. In addition, unlike rich economies,
where VC investment always makes positive proﬁt despite competition, in poor economies VCs also
make investments that generate zero proﬁt.
The existence of areas of underinvestment, the strictly positive proﬁt obtained the participating
VC, and the cash overspending by indulgent angels all raise legitimate questions as to whether orIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 19
not the outcome can be further improved. One possible way of achieving the ﬁrst best outcome
could be to create a coalition of indulgent angels, with each investor holding stakes in both projects,
while investing eﬀort and (overs)investing cash in only one project. Such a coalition would make the
”two-project eﬀort” ﬁrst best outcome always attainable; both investors would make zero proﬁt,
essentially driving VCs out of business. A quick analysis shows that capital investment I1 and I2
and allocations of investors’ stakes in both projects is a situation that is possible, although the
exact solution involves bargaining between four parties and is beyond the scope of this paper.
In fact, such coalitions of angel investors are, in all but name, VC funds without limited partners.
Therefore, another alternative to avoid underinvestment would be to allow VCs to invest excess
cash in the project they support. Probably, this is what some VCs did in the late nineties. The
diﬃculty is that this solution leads to another agency conﬂict between VCs, who act as agents for
the true owners of this money – the limited partners in venture capital funds.
A. Empirical Implications
Our results suggest the empirical implications of several types. First, there are implications con-
cerning the VCs’ returns in their portfolio companies. Second, we make inferences about investment
patterns of angels’ investment and VCs’ investment. Third, we expect to observe some diﬀerences
in start-up ﬁnancing in countries with diﬀerent per capita wealth of the richest angel investors.
To be more speciﬁc, when comparing VCs’ investment portfolios to angels’ portfolios, we should
observe that VC-backed companies are relatively more heterogeneous in terms of their proﬁtability
or market share, but they nevertheless use compatible technology, i.e., belong to the same industry
or related industries, while companies in the angel investment portfolio are more closely related.
This diﬀerence can be tested by constructing a ”heterogeneity index” for VCs’ and angels’ invest-
ment portfolios. For both portfolios, we should observe more information spillover (e.g., adoption
of the same technology, use of similar business models) between portfolio companies than between
companies ﬁnanced independently.
Second, regarding the ex-ante probability of success for each company on an individual basis,
we predict that VCs invest in more risky companies than angel investors. Ex-ante valuation of
some of these companies might not even justify the investment made, showing the negative NPV.
This prediction can be tested by comparing the business plans of entrepreneurial companies.
Third, the ex-post proﬁtability of VC backed companies is higher than for those ﬁnanced by
rich angels who also invest into a portfolio of companies, but lower than for companies backed by
angels who are single-company investors.
Despite these diﬀerences in the proﬁtability of portfolio companies,VC returns remain positive
and are higher than angel returns. This is consistent with the previous prediction, because VC
investors apparently consistently receive a higher project share than angel investors in return for
investment of the same size.
Finally, in the economies with lower per capita wealth of rich angel investors, we should observe
a higher proportion of VC-backed start-ups. At the same time, VC would receive on averageIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 20
lower proﬁts from these start-ups, then from their investments in fewer start-up in rich economies.
The reason is the following: in rich economies VCs lose out to angel investors the projects, in
which investors earn zero expected proﬁts, and are able to ﬁnance only the projects that generate
positive proﬁts to VCs. As we have indicated before, these positive proﬁts serve as a commitment
mechanism in the investor’s moral hazard problem.
IV. Conclusion
In this article we study entrepreneurs’ choice of investors, who must provide ﬁnancial capital and
eﬀort for projects with externalities.
Each angel investor can exert eﬀort for only one project, while VCs can invest in a portfolio
of projects. When coordinated investment is necessary because of a strong externality eﬀect, the
VCs’ portfolio approach can potentially lead to the ﬁrst best outcome, whereas angels investing in
separate projects may generate a suboptimal outcome, because they tend to undersupply eﬀort for
their projects and free-ride on competitors’ results.
We have shown that angels can demonstrate their commitment to provide eﬀort by supplying
entrepreneurs with more cash than necessary for the projects’ success. Because of the overinvest-
ment, angels are then obliged to exert a high degree of eﬀort in order to earn zero proﬁt. This result
oﬀers an explanation for the lavish supply of cash attracted by certain entrepreneurial projects.
Due to the lack of coordination between angel investors, regions still remain where they either
underinvest or fail to ﬁnance a group of projects, because they have negative NPV, if considered
as stand-alone projects. Although portfolio investors, like angels and VCs, always manage to
ﬁnance these projects, they are less successful in winning contracts from entrepreneurs running the
underinvested projects.
The underinvestment problem can potentially be resolved by coalitions of angel investors who
hold stakes in the portfolio of projects (”synthetic VCs”), or by allowing VCs to overinvest cash in
their projects, which could be dangerous due to the principal-agency problem regarding relations
between VCs (agents) and limited partners in venture capital funds (principals).
The results of this paper allow us to make the following conjectures.
First, a VC investment portfolio should include companies that are relatively heterogeneous in
terms of their proﬁtability or market share, but which nevertheless use compatible technology, i.e.,
belong to the same industry or related industries with high inter-industry externalities. Companies
in the angel investment portfolio should be more closely related. For both portfolios, we should
observe more information spillover (e.g., adoption of the same technology, use of similar business
models) between portfolio companies than between companies ﬁnanced independently.
Second, looking at the ex-ante probability of success for each company on an individual basis,
we will ﬁnd that VCs invest in more risky companies than angel investors. Ex-ante valuation of
some of these companies might not even justify the investment made, showing the negative NPV.
Third, the ex-post proﬁtability of VC backed companies is higher than for those ﬁnanced by
rich angels who also invest into a portfolio of companies, but lower than for companies backed byIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 21
angels who are single-company investors.
Finally, despite these diﬀerences in the proﬁtability of portfolio companies,VC returns remain
positive and are higher than angel returns. VC investors apparently consistently receive a higher
project share than angel investors in return for investment of the same size. This result follows
directly from our model, which made no assumptions about VCs’ bargaining power or the scarce-
ness of angel investment. On the contrary, if angel investors are poor and cannot invest cash into
a portfolio of projects, VCs will invest in some zero proﬁt projects. As individual investors become
richer, VCs ﬁnance a smaller number of projects, but make higher proﬁts on their investment!Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 22
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Notes
1Casamatta (2000) looks for contracts soliciting eﬀort from both entrepreneur and investor, because she studies
relations between the entrepreneur and investors, modeling them as a double-sided moral hazard problem. Here we
focus on the entrepreneur’s choice of investor, thus only the investor’s eﬀort is important.
2In Casamatta (2000) convertible debt should be used to elicit eﬀort from the investor for a single-project model.
Using convertible bonds does not change the results of this paper. Probably, this is due to the fact that we focus on
a portfolio coordination problem.
3The model works without this assumption, but analysis of the observed equilibrium becomes unnecessarily over-
complicated.
4Although the value of K is negligible, we keep K in the formulas in order to make a distinction from the situation
in which the project gets no investment at all.
5Entrepreneurs are never interested in diverted K, because of the assumption that K is very small. Therefore,
e n t r e p r e n e u r sa l w a y sp r e f e rt oi n v e s tK rather than divert K and make the project fail.
6For bigger K, there exists a region where angel ﬁnancing is impossible, while investing into both projects is the
ﬁr s tb e s tr e s u l t ½
e<β(1 − β)(1+R)V,
e>β(1 + R)V − 2K.
In this case the VC investment is the entrepreneurs’ only choice. The VC investor provides ﬁnancial capital K and
human capital e for each project in return for shares αVC , 1 and αVC , 2, such that
αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R =
e
β (1 − β)V
.




e − 2K.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 25
A. Appendix A.
In order to understand what kind of contracts between entrepreneurs and angel investors can be
observed in equilibrium, we start our analysis from the eﬀort choice by two angel investors, who
become involved in projects 1 and 2. The angel investing in project i selects his level of eﬀort (zero
or e) so as to maximize his expected proﬁt given his share αi in project i and the share αj in project
j attributable to investor j.
The outcome should be the Nash equilibrium of the game described by the following matrix
eﬀort 0 e
0 (0;0) (α1βV;α2βRV − e)
e (α1βV − e;α2βRV) (α1β (2 − β)V − e;α2β (2 − β)RV − e)
where the elements of the matrix are the investors’ expected payoﬀs net of the eﬀort exerted. Rows
correspond to the level of eﬀort exerted by investor 1 and columns correspond to the level of eﬀort
exerted by investor 2. Figure 1 shows the extensive form of the game
For R>1 four equilibria are possible. They include three pure strategy equilibria (e;e), (0;e)
and (0;0) and a mixed strategy equilibrium.
Equilibrium (e;e)
(e;e) is the equilibrium if and only if
½
e ≤ α1β(1 − β)V,
e ≤ α2β(1 − β)RV.
Assuming that when indiﬀerent between making eﬀort e or zero eﬀort, the investors will exert eﬀort
e, we obtain the minimum values of αe
A,1 and αe








Despite the competition, the net proﬁts of both investors can remain strictly positive even at the
minimum values αe
A,1 and αe






where Ii is the ﬁnancial investment into project i provided by the angel investor. For example, if
I1 = I2 = K, then both investors make positive proﬁts.
We are not saying that αe
A,1 and αe
A,2 will necessarily be the allocations of shares received by


























Figure 1: The tree of the eﬀort choice by investorsIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 27










β (2 − β)V +( I1 − K)=β (2 − β)V −
2−β







β (2 − β)RV +( I2 − K)=β (2 − β)RV −
2−β
1−βe +( I2 − K).
From α1 < 1 and α2 < 1 it follows that the necessary condition for this equilibrium to exist is
e<β(1 − β)V . Due to the moral hazard problem, angel investor 1 will not provide a positive
eﬀort, e,i fe lies in the area β (1 − β)V< e < β (1 − β)(1+R)V despite the strictly positive
proﬁt that this investor would make, if he could commit to e.
Equilibrium (0;e)
The outcome in which eﬀort e is invested in project 2 only, is the Nash equilibrium iﬀ
½
e>α 1β (1 − β)V,
e ≤ α2βRV.
Given the investors’ participation constraints, i.e., that investors’ proﬁts cannot be negative, we
obtain the minimum values of αne
A,1 and αne








where the superscript ”ne” refers to ”no eﬀort” by investor 1 and only by investor 1, because
investor 2 still exerts e.F r o mα1 < 1 and α2 < 1 it follows that the necessary condition for this
equilibrium to exist is
K + e ≤ βRV.
If investors receive αne
A,1 and αne
A,2, their proﬁts are zero. The entrepreneurs’ proﬁts are equal to the
NPVs of the projects: ½
Πne
E1,A = βV − K,
Πe
E2,A = βRV − K − e.
Notice that for ﬁxed α1 and α2 this equilibrium is not compatible with the (e;e) equilibrium,
because α1 <α e
A,1.
Equilibrium (0;0)
(0;0) is the equilibrium iﬀ ½
e>α 1βV,
e>α 2βRV.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 28
In this case both projects have zero gross payoﬀ; hence, none of the investors is interested in
i n v e s t i n gi nt h e m .W ec a ni n f e rt h a ti f
e>β R V ,
then no investment is possible, although for e<β(1 − β)(1+R)V the ﬁrst best outcome might
be to invest money and eﬀort into both projects!
Mixed strategy equilibrium
If the following system of inequalities holds
½
e<α 1βV,
e ≥ α2β(1 − β)RV,
then two Nash equilibria exist at the same time: (0;e) and (e;0). Each angel investor would prefer
to provide zero eﬀort if he knew that the other was investing e at the R&D stage.
A mixed equilibrium exists in which investor i decides to provide zero eﬀort at the R&D stage
with probability pi and decides to provide e with probability (1 − pi),w h e r epi is the solution to
½
p10+( 1− p1)α2βRV = p1α2βRV +( 1− p1)α2β (2 − β)RV − e,









.W et h u sh a v e
ρ1 =
e − α2β (1 − β)RV
α2β2RV
and ρ2 =
e − α1β (1 − β)V
α1β2V
,
The expected payoﬀs to investors 1 and 2 are
ΠA,1 = α1V −
e
β













for which the investors’ proﬁts are zero. Since
½
e<α 1βV,
e ≥ α2β(1 − β)RV,Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 29
must hold as well as αm





e ≥ (e + βK)(1− β),
e + βK < βV.
So, the necessary condition for the mixed equilibrium to exist is e + βK < βV.
For αA,i = αm
A,i entrepreneurs’ proﬁts are
Πm

































which are always positive
Since investor 2 observes the other investor’s eﬀort before he makes his own eﬀort, the mixed
strategy equilibrium is not subgame perfect and it is never realized in our model.Indulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 30
B. Appendix B.
Proof. Proposition 4. The incentive compatibility constraint for the VC is
(αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R)βV − (2K + e) ≤ (αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R)β (2 − β)V − 2(K + e)
or
e ≤ (αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R)β (1 − β)V,
with competition driving it down to equality
e =( αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R)β (1 − β)V.
Entrepreneurs are interested in VC investor, only if their proﬁt sill be higher than with angel
investment. Participation constraints for entrepreneurs Ei and E2 are, respectively
½
(1 − αVC , 1)β (2 − β)V> β V− K,
(1 − αVC , 2)β (2 − β)RV > βRV − (K + e),
or (

















β (2 − β)V
¸
β (1 − β)V,
which gives
e ≤ (1 − β)
2 β (1 + R)V +2( 1− β)K.
4
Proof. Proposition 6. IC constraints for VC and competition lead to
αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R =
e
β (1 − β)V




β(1−β)RV in return for e
1−β










β (2 − β)V + e
1−β − K





β (2 − β)RV + e
1−β − KIndulgent Angels or Stingy VCs? 31
which gives ½
αVC , 1β (2 − β)V ≤ e + K
αVC , 2β (2 − β)RV ≤ e + K
and since the VC’s proﬁt cannot be negative, we arrive at an equality
(αVC , 1 + αVC , 2R)=2
e + K
β (2 − β)V
V Cw o u l di ns u c hac a s em a k eaz e r op r o ﬁt, which contradicts VC’s IC constraint.
















5 K = 0; R =1
Figure 1: Angel and VC investment as functions of e/V and β for R =1 , K =0 .H e r e a n d i n
the following ﬁgures numbers 1-3 denote areas of ”poor”, ”rich” and ”indulgent” angel investment,
respectively, and 4 denotes VC investment. In 5 ”no-investment” is the ﬁrst best outcome. Tildes
















K = 0; R =2
































K = 0; E/V = 0.5


















Figure 5: Angel and VC investment as functions of e/V and β for R =1 , K =0 ,i fa n g e l sa r e
wealth constrained. In 4∗ the ﬁrst best outcome is now achieved by VCs. In 100 eﬃciency is lost –
angels cannot make excessive investment of cash, which leads to unerinvestment of human capital.